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INTRODUCTION
Barry Smith is a man of such strong views that his greatest 
impact on other researchers, especially if these are equally 
opinionated, may be the often forceful resistance his ideas 
are met with. Occasionally, however, after having interacted 
with him, with hindsight one realizes that he changed one’s 
mind after all, even though one’s first reaction may have 
been one of loathing. Thus, it is to Barry that I owe my hav-
ing become an Aristotelian, but before anything else, he 
may have prevented me from abandoning philosophy for 
computing science. It was in 2001, during my stay as re-
search associate at the Italian National Research Council in 
picturesque Padua, and while I was involved in the develop-
ment of the foundational ontology DOLCE,1 that I became 
aware of the work of the Mancunian brothers-in-arms Barry 
Smith, Kevin Mulligan and Peter Simons, as exemplified in 
particular by the volume Parts and Moments edited by Barry 
in 1982. I was immediately charmed and won over by their 
staunch and apt defense of a rich Aristotelian metaphysic 
which not only allows for universals and particulars alike, 
but recognizes substances as well as dependent entia minora 
or moments. The contrast with the Quine-Davidson tradi-
tion in which I had been previously raised as a philosophy 
student was truly mind-blowing, and when Barry founded 
the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information 
Science at the University of Leipzig, I gladly seized the op-
portunity to join him there as a Humboldt fellow in 2002. 
This decision marked a turning point in my life, even though 
I was definitively converted to a rich Aristotelian ontol-
ogy only later, while writing my Ph.D. under the joint su-
pervision of Barry and Kevin Mulligan at the University of 
Geneva between 2003 and 2007.
If there is one paper among the whole body of Smith’s 
work I would have to cite as having had the most last-
ing influence on the orientation of my research, it is his 
1997 article “On Substances, Accidents and Universals: In 
Defence of a Constituent Ontology.” Indeed, with this es-
say Barry revived an ancient conceptual framework that 
Ignacio Angelelli (1967, p. 11ff; 1991, p. 12) has named the 
“Ontological Square,”2 a four-fold division of entities sug-
gested3 in Aristotle’s Categories 1a20–1b10 which is based on 
two orthogonal distinctions, namely:
1 being in a subject vs. not being in a subject,  
i.e. attributes vs. substances, and
2 being said of a subject vs. not being said of a subject,  
i.e. universals vs. particulars.
The cross-wise combination of these dichotomies results 
in a categorial scheme which comprises universal and par-
ticular substances, i.e. kinds and objects, as well as universal 
and particular attributes, i.e. characters and moments:
Substances Attributes
Universals Kinds
e.g. Man
Characters
e.g. Wisdom
Particulars Objects
e.g. Socrates
Moments
e.g. Socrates’  
wisdom
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Universal substances or kinds (e.g. Man) are instantiated 
by particular substances or objects (e.g. Socrates). Particular 
attributes or moments (e.g. Socrates’ wisdom) are cases or 
tokens of universal attributes or characters (e.g. Wisdom). 
Moments are said to inhere in objects, e.g. Socrates’ wisdom 
inheres in Socrates. 
The Aristotelian Ontological Square has been later on ad-
vocated as a foundation for natural science by the late E. J. 
Lowe, notably in his “The Four Category Ontology” (2006). 
Though this book greatly inspired me, it is Smith’s 1997 es-
say which has started my own obsession with the subject. 
And if I have developed a Logic of the Ontological Square 
(Schneider 2009; 2010), this is also due to Barry’s consistent 
attacks against fantology (Smith, 2005), the idea that ontol-
ogy can be simply read off the logical form of standard pred-
icate calculus. 
Meanwhile, Barry himself, however, has moved on to a Six 
Category Ontology consisting of objects, moments and pro-
cesses as well as their respective universals (Smith 2005; Arp, 
Smith, and Spear 2015). I believe that the most appropriate 
way to acknowledge my deep indebtedness to Barry’s work 
and encouragement is to revisit some issues that have always 
troubled me and with respect to which I respectfully beg to 
differ with Barry as his loyal, if slightly dissident, student.
The topics related to the Ontological Square I will discuss 
in this contribution are the following:
1. How can the choice of such a rich ontological scheme 
be motivated beyond mere considerations as to its ap-
plicability within information science?
2. How can the Ontological Square be formally recon-
structed?
3. How can we do justice to time and change within the 
Ontological Square?
The first question is intimately tied to the issue of realism 
dear to Barry, and my heretical answer will be a combination 
of Carnapian deflationism and Strawsonian descriptivism. It 
is also in the spirit of ontological deflationism or minimal-
ism that the second question will be tackled, i.e. by providing 
a set of uncontroversial introduction and elimination rules 
for the various ontological categories. Thus, pace Barry, the 
completeness of the Aristotelian Ontological Square can be 
shown in a purely formal manner. Finally, my response to the 
third problem will commit me to a form of fragmentalism 
(cf. Fine 2005, 281–284), for the general framework of the 
Ontological Square has to be instantiated in infinitely many 
temporal ontologies which merely differ in the reference of 
the uniquely designating expression “the present moment.” 
To use Barry’s terminology, I declare my latish conversion to 
SNAP (Grenon and Smith 2004), without however adopting 
SPAN (ibid.). In fact I will argue that, pace Barry Smith, the 
passage or flow of time cannot be captured, but shows itself 
exclusively in the succession of presentist ontologies.
2. JUSTIFYING THE ARISTOTELIAN  
 ONTOLOGICAL SQUARE
2.1 The question of realism and ontological minimalism
The most immediate way of arguing for the choice of a given 
theory, respectively ontology, is to maintain (putting one’s 
foot down) that it corresponds to reality, that it describes 
how reality is. Barry has tirelessly defended this position 
throughout his career, and even argued that realism is a 
methodological sine qua non for building good scientific on-
tologies (see Smith and Ceusters 2010). However, the realist 
notion of a correspondence to the world is open to anti-real-
ist challenges.4 Unfortunately it does not do to reply to these 
attacks by providing an ontological account of truth as cor-
respondence, since this assay is immediately questioned by 
anti-realists as “yet another theory,” the correspondence of 
which to reality is an open question in turn. It is easy to see 
that these moves initiate a potentially endless argumentation 
game of challenges and parries (cf. Smart 1995) in which 
it remains ultimately undecided whether it is the realist or 
the anti-realist who ends up bearing the burden of proof, let 
alone who eventually wins the argument.
A popular escape from potentially endless debates is to 
deflate them, and I plead guilty of having ended up sitting 
with the deflaters on the question of realism. Indeed, accord-
ing to ontological deflationists or minimalists such as Rudolf 
Carnap (1950/1956) and Amie Thomasson (2015), existence 
questions fall into two sorts:
• they are either answerable by trivial inferences from un-
controversial empirical or conceptual premisses (such as 
the inference from “there are tables” to “there are material 
objects”), or
• they are really questions about the appropriateness to 
adopt a certain linguistic framework in which such exis-
tence claims can be stated.
This strategy has the advantage that objections to certain 
existence claims can be countered in two ways: either they 
can be rejected as plainly conflicting with the rules of use 
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that authorize the introduction of the contested entities, or 
they can be charitably re-interpreted as actually question-
ing the linguistic framework itself of which these meaning- 
constitutive rules are part. Therefore, the problem of justify-
ing ontological commitments is ultimately to be settled by 
pragmatic considerations regarding the advantages and dis-
advantages of choosing a particular language which allows 
to state the existence of disputed entities.
Thus, ontological minimalism does not so much consist 
in deflating existence questions than in defusing ontological 
debates about existence claims regarding contested entities 
inasmuch as these claims are the conclusions of uncontro-
versial inferences within a given linguistic framework. In es-
sence, the contester is being faced with the inconsistency of 
wanting to have the cake and eat it: one cannot dispute the 
existence of entities of a certain class while using a language 
the rules of which allow referring to or quantifying over 
these entities.
Ontological minimalism goes hand in hand with a modest 
view of the role of philosophy in general and of ontology in 
particular that was dominant before the second half of the 
last century both within phenomenology and within analytic 
philosophy (Thomasson 2015, pp. 4–13). Briefly stated, the 
division of work between philosophy and science was per-
ceived as follows: while the former uses conceptual methods, 
i.e. recurs to linguistic and/or conceptual analysis in order to 
clarify the meaning of notions that are central to scientific 
inquiry and everyday practice, the latter applies empirical 
methods to the investigation of matters of fact.
According to Thomasson, this modest view of ontology 
is best illustrated by Carnap’s (1950/1956) approach to ex-
istence questions. Carnap distinguished internal questions 
from external questions, a distinction that echoes the di-
chotomy of using vs. mentioning terms. Indeed, while using 
terms referring to certain entities according to the rules of 
a given language, existence questions can be uncontrover-
sially answered either by conceptual analysis or by empiri-
cal methods. So the question of whether a certain biological 
species exists can be tackled by empirical observations, while 
the problem whether there is a prime number between 17 
and 23 can be figured out by mathematical calculation. 
Furthermore, from the statements “there are platypus” or 
“there is a prime number between 17 and 23” one can trivi-
ally infer “there are organisms” respectively “there are num-
bers.” Now, within a language the rules of which license the 
inference to existence claims regarding certain entities such 
as numbers or properties, one cannot sensibly question the 
existence of the very same entities while using the terms that 
are supposed to refer to them. However, the contester may 
be charitably interpreted as mentioning these terms and as 
questioning the rationale of choosing a linguistic frame-
work that permits the statement of those existence claims 
(Thomasson 2015, pp. 12, 39–44). 
Hence Carnap’s treatment of existence claims implies a 
simple realism about any entities the existence of which can 
be established according to the rules of the language that is 
respectively used (Thomasson 2015, p. 145f). Concurrently 
it also leads to a form of deflationism about philosophical 
debates concerning the existence of certain sorts of enti-
ties, since any such debate is spurious, not because the dis-
cussants are talking past each other, but because existence 
questions can be so easily and straightforwardly answered 
(Thomasson 2015, pp. 158–160).
It should be emphasized that Carnapian minimalism does 
not lead to relativism about existence and truth: that the 
meaning of terms like planet is dependent on the linguis-
tic rules that govern the use of these terms does not imply 
that the truth of the statements “there is a planet between 
Mercury and Earth” or “there are planets” is a matter of lin-
guistic convention (Thomasson 2015, p. 60). Furthermore, 
Carnap’s approach does not presuppose a clear-cut distinc-
tion between analytic and synthetic propositions, but is com-
patible with there being a spectrum of intermediary cases 
(Thomasson 2015, p. 53 fn. 18). Finally, Carnapian minimal-
ism is not committed to quantifier variance, but embraces 
the idea of existence as a univocal, formal notion governed 
by a fixed set of rules (Thomasson 2015, pp. 63–80).
2.2  Descriptive metaphysics to the rescue of  
 ontological minimalism
The most serious objection to ontological minimalism is 
that it involves an element of arbitrariness as to the linguistic 
or conceptual framework in which existence questions are 
couched. But if it is a matter of arbitrary choice which lan-
guage we adopt, then so is also the range of existence ques-
tions we may ask (Thomasson 2015, pp. 41–42). 
Of course, Carnap and Thomasson do argue that this arbi-
trariness is only apparent, since it is a practical issue which 
language we choose in a certain context (Thomasson 2015, p. 
42). The choice of linguistic or conceptual framework is thus 
determined by our purposes (e.g. to account for biological 
phenomena), but is also informed by theoretical consider-
ations (e.g. as to the simplicity or fruitfulness to use a certain 
language in describing a given range of empirical phenom-
ena). Nonetheless, though the decision to use a linguistic 
framework that allows for stating and answering certain 
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existence questions may not be totally arbitrary, there are 
doubtlessly many sorts of purposes one may want to achieve, 
and also a multitude of theoretical considerations that one 
may consider relevant. Hence, ontological minimalism does 
seem to imply ontological pluralism after all.
This may be a welcome consequence to some—certainly to 
me—since it allows for an equable attitude towards the maze 
of drawn-out debates about minutiae that lately seem to ob-
struct real progress in analytic ontology. Nonetheless, there 
undoubtedly remains the impression of an embarrassment 
of metaphysical choice. This feeling might be mitigated if one 
could identify a linguistic framework that is fundamental in 
some sense to every discourse. Now, it can be argued that 
ordinary language discourse underpins human practice in 
all its forms, and thus is prior to the specialist idioms of arts 
and sciences, which can be regarded as outgrowths of every-
day speech. Therefore, while ontological pluralism seems to 
be an unavoidable consequence of ontological minimalism, 
it is possible to single out ordinary language as a linguistic 
framework presupposed by every kind of specialized talk, be 
it formal or informal. To put it in Austin’s words: Ordinary 
language may not be the last word, but it should be the first 
(Austin 1979, p. 185).
It has to be pointed out, though, that the purpose cannot 
be to simply read off ontology from ordinary language use. It 
is more fruitful to focus on the underlying conceptual struc-
tures that constitute the preconditions of speech acts, in par-
ticular acts of referring and asserting. The task of identifying 
and analyzing these conceptual structures is incumbent 
upon descriptive metaphysics (Strawson 1959, pp. 9–10), 
which perfectly complements ontological minimalism. 
Indeed, ontological minimalism and descriptive meta-
physics agree on the view that the task of philosophy is to 
elucidate the structure of our thought, to trace the connec-
tions between our concepts in order to clarify the latter’s 
function (Strawson 1992, 19), and to uncover the funda-
mental features of our conceptual and linguistic framework 
(ibid., 24). Now, this view starkly contrasts with the stance 
defended also by Barry that formal ontology uncovers the 
structure of the world; according to him, conceptual analysis 
as described above is a form of Kantianism. What is meant 
as an insult would only constitute an objection against de-
scriptivism if the focus on our concepts implied an adop-
tion of anti-realism. However, as already pointed out above, 
Carnapian minimalism does not imply relativism as to exis-
tence and truth. Moreover, conceptual analysis as defended 
by Strawson (and most recently by P. M. S. Hacker 2010) is 
compatible with the tenable core of the correspondence con-
ception of truth, i.e. what Paul Horwich (1998, p. 104f) has 
called “the correspondence intuition”, namely that our be-
liefs, including our ontological presuppositions, are the caus-
al result of our exposure to or interaction with the world, be 
it through observation or through instruction by our peers 
(Strawson 1992, p. 95). Properly understood, Kantianism 
does not conflict with realism.
2.3  Descriptive metaphysics as Aristotelian ontology
As it has already been pointed out by MacMahon (1977), 
Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics naturally provides the 
tools for reconstructing the Aristotelian Ontological Square. 
In fact, the distinctions within the Ontological Square can 
be motivated by considerations on the nature of acts of as-
sertion (Strawson 1959, pp. 167–170). Asserting a proposi-
tion is tantamount to asserting a non-relational tie between 
terms, thus grounding the unity of the proposition.5
A term can be said to “collect” the entities of which it can 
be assertively tied to (Strawson 1959, p. 167). Each entity re-
ferred to by a term can thus be regarded as a principle of 
collecting other entities. Therefore, basic classes of entities 
can be distinguished in terms of the ways in which they col-
lect other entities. For the purposes of the argument, we only 
need to take into account non-relational ties (1) between 
universals and particulars and (2) between particulars.
Let us first consider the case of universals collecting par-
ticulars and vice versa. A universal (e.g. Man, Wisdom) may 
collect an unlimited number of particulars (e.g. Socrates, 
Plato, Aristotle), but a particular (Plato) may equally collect 
innumerably many universals (Wisdom, Man, Philosopher, 
etc.) (Strawson 1959, p. 169). The difference between univer-
sals and particulars consists in the fact that particulars col-
lect universals in virtue of their continuous identity (ibid.), 
while universals collect particulars in virtue of conferring 
them a resemblance (Strawson 1959, pp. 169, 170). In other 
words, a particular collects a set of universals simply by be-
ing the very same subject that the latter can be said of, while 
a universal collects a set of particulars, namely its extension, 
by being a resemblance maker for these particulars.
Amongst particulars we can differentiate between objects 
and moments: objects (e.g. Socrates) can collect an unlimited 
number of other particulars, especially moments (Socrates’ 
wisdom, Socrates’ baldness), while moments can be assert-
ively tied to one particular, namely an object, only. Moments 
are non-transferable in the sense that they are specific to one 
object (or, in the relational case, to one series of objects) only.
Amongst universals we may distinguish between sortal 
universals or kinds and characterising universals or charac-
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ters. A kind (e.g. Man) provides a principle of distinguish-
ing, counting, and grouping together objects which does not 
presuppose the latter being already distinguished, counted 
or grouped together by another principle. A character (e.g. 
Wisdom), by contrast, may only provide a principle of 
counting and grouping together objects in virtue of them be-
ing already grouped together by another principle, i.e. ulti-
mately by a kind (Strawson 1959, p. 168). 
Particulars, whether objects or moments, are akin to char-
acters inasmuch as they may only collect other particulars 
provided these are already distinguished or distinguishable 
by (other) universals.
Finally, characters not only collect objects, but also mo-
ments: indeed, whenever a character is assertively tied to an 
object, a moment that is collected by the character is also as-
sertively tied to that object. Thus, that Socrates died implies 
there having been a moment, namely a particular death, 
that inhered in Socrates (Strawson 1959, p. 168). To sum up, 
then, we can distinguish between four non-relational ties 
that articulate the Ontological Square (cf. Fig. 1):
1. instantiation: an object instantiates or is an instance of a 
kind;
2. tokenization: a moment is a case or a token of some  
character;
3. exemplification: an object exemplifies a character;
4. inherence: a moment inheres in an object.
Fig. 1: The Ontological Square
The preceding reflections only constitute an informal mo-
tivation of the distinctions that make up the Ontological 
Square. A formal justification shall be provided in the shape 
of introduction and elimination rules of respective existence 
claims within a formalisation of the fragment of ordinary 
language discussed above.
3. RECONSTRUCTING THE ARISTOTELIAN  
 ONTOLOGICAL SQUARE
3.1  From features to objects
The deflationist approach to ontology sketched above is 
spelled out in a series of languages, each member of which, 
with the exception of the starting point, is a conservative ex-
tension of its predecessor in virtue of two operations:
1. the addition of individual terms of a new category to the 
alphabet of the predecessor,
2. the addition of introduction/elimination rules for state-
ments involving these new terms, supplemented by 
further auxiliary rules governing the predicates that 
occur in these statements as well as by definitions.
The introduction/elimination rules play the same role in 
our version of neo-Carnapian deflationism as the instances 
of Thomasson’s (2015, p. 86) core rule for the term “exists,” 
according to which Ks exist if, and only if, the application 
conditions actually associated with the term “K” hold. These 
rules are certainly at the heart of ontological deflationism, 
but I agree with Evnine (2016) that they are not sufficient 
for providing a complete basis for the use of the terms that 
are introduced. In order to be able to infer properties of the 
admitted entities beyond those explicitly stated on the right-
hand side of the introduction/elimination rules, one needs 
to adopt further rules and definitions. Here one may draw 
an analogy to the fact that deflationism about truth needs 
recursive rules in addition to the instances of the T-schema 
“<p> is true if and only if p” in order to offer a satisfactory 
framework for semantics.
The logical starting point for this successive enlargement 
is a language LF in which no individual terms occur altogeth-
er. This would be a feature-placing language the well-formed 
formulae of which correspond to statements of a “naming 
game” such as:
• Rain(ing) here now!
• Water here now!
• Coal here now!
• Rabbit here now!
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• Scent of roses here now!
• Red here now! 
that simply protocol the apparition of subjectless features 
within the sphere of conscious experience (Strawson 1959, 
pp. 202–203). These features may be that of homogeneous 
stuffs, as in the case of “water” or “coal,” of heterogeneous 
patterns of spatial or temporal occupation, as in the case of 
“rabbit,” or of qualia such as “scent of roses” or “red.” 
It should be emphasized that features are not properties 
of space-time points, since the spatial and temporal adverbs 
appearing in the statements of a feature-placing language 
are to be regarded as sentential, namely modal operators. I 
shall return to the issue of temporal modality further below. 
So let us consider the atomic well-formed formulae of LF as 
corresponding to single-word phrases in natural language. 
More precisely, the predicates of LF are all anadic, and thus 
by themselves constitute the atomic sentences of LF. 
The feature-placing language LF can be extended to an 
object-centered language LO, which in addition to anadic 
predicates or single-word sentences comprises predicates of 
any adicity, with argument places for variables ranging over 
the domain of objects (xo,x1o,x2o, etc., yo,y1o,y2o, etc., zo,z1o,z2o, etc.). 
A mapping μ associates to each LF-predicate a set of Lo-
predicates of non-zero adicity. Indeed, some features, e.g. 
those corresponding to homogeneous stuffs such as “coal,” 
may be associated to more than one predicate of objects, 
e.g. “lump of coal,” “grain of coal,” or “veins of coal,” since 
they may be subject to arbitrary (de-)compositions. Other 
features, in particular  those that are tantamount to patterns 
of spatial and temporal distribution, may generally be asso-
ciated with single predicates of objects only, since they may 
not undergo arbitrary fusions. 
Given the mapping μ, one can, for each pair of predicates 
ϕ of LF and ψ of LO, such that ψ∈μ(ϕ), propose an introduc-
tion/elimination rule, which has ϕ as its single premiss and a 
full existential quantification of the open formula ψ(x1o,…,xno) 
as its conclusion: 
 IE1    [ψ∈μ(ϕ):]    ϕ⊣⊢∃x1o…∃xno  ψ(x1o,…,xno)
Those LO-predicates, for which holds
 ⊢ ∃x1o…∃xno  ψ(x1o,…,xno)
are referred to as satisfiable predicates. There is a subset S of 
monadic predicates of LO such that identity statements about 
objects presuppose that these objects jointly satisfy at least 
one member of S: these predicates are called sortals.6 I write 
“ψ+s” for “ is a sortal” and “ψ-s” for “ is a non-sortal.”
Note that by no means the passage from a feature-placing 
language to an object-centered language sketched here is 
claimed to be cognitively plausible in any way. Far from pre-
supposing that each speaker of English or any other natural 
language ever consciously goes through the stage of feature-
placing, this step merely serves as a starting point for a logi-
cal construction.
3.2 Universals: kinds and characters
The language LO can be extended to the language LU by in-
troducing individual variables ranging over universals, i.e. 
kinds (marked by the superscript “k”) or characters (marked 
by the superscript “c.i”, where i is a number indicating the 
adicity of the character):
 
• Xk, Yk, Zk, X1k,Y1k,Z1k, X2k, Y2k, Z2k,…
• Xc.i,Yc.i, Zc.i, X1c.i,Y1c.i, Z1c.i, X2c.i,Y2c.i, Z2c.i,…
Furthermore, I adopt a dyadic predicate “Xk/c.i⋮ψ+/-s” (read-
ing: “Xk/c.i is the abstraction of ψ+/-s”), which holds between 
universal variables and satisfiable predicates of LO, such that 
sortal predicates are always associated with kind variables 
and n-place non-sortal predicates always with character 
variables of (non-zero) adicity n. Thus one can stipulate in-
troduction and elimination rules for existential claims about 
kinds and characters:
IE2 ψ+s (xo)⊣⊢∃Xk (Xk⋮ψ+s ∧xo  ι Xk)
IE3 ψ-s (x1o,…,xno)⊣⊢ ∃Xc.n (Xc.n⋮ψ-s ∧x1o,…,xno ϵ Xc.n)
where “xo ι Xk” means that the object xo instantiates or is an 
instance of the kind Xk, and “x1o,…,xno ϵ Xc.n” means that the 
objects  exemplify the (n-adic) character Xc.n.
3.3 Moments
The language of universals LU can be expanded into the lan-
guage of moments LM by introducing variables ranging over 
moments of any (non-zero) adicity i, i.e.
x m.i, y m.i, z m.i, x1 m.i, y1 m.i, z1 m.i, x2 m.i, y2 m.i, z2 m.i…
and by adopting the introduction/elimination rule
IE4 x1o,…,xno ϵ Xc.n ⊣⊢∃xm.n (xm.n τ Xc.n∧xm.n ⟨x1o,…,xno)
where 
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1. “xm.n τ Xc.n” means that the moment xm.n is a token of 
 the character , and 
2. “xm.n ⟨x1o,…,xno” means that the moment xm.n inheres 
 in the objects x1o,…,xno.
It is commonly assumed that moments are not transfer-
able from one object to another. In other words, no moment 
may inhere in more than one object or tuple of objects:
R1  xm ⟨x1o,…,xno, xm ⟨y1o,…,yno ⊢x1o = y1o ∧...∧ xno = yno
In the process of introducing terms for entities of the vari-
ous categories within the Aristotelian Ontological Square, 
we have also added predicates for instantiation, exempli-
fication, inherence and tokenization. These predicates may 
aptly be called “transcendentals”’ inasmuch as they cross the 
categorial borders between kinds, characters, objects and 
moments. For this reason, it is only a matter of caution not 
to augment the Language of the Ontological Square with 
introduction rules that would allow the reification of those 
predicates, a choice which amounts to a form of nominalism 
about purported higher-order universals.
3.3 Grounding and the ontological priority of objects
Using the introduction and elimination rules stated above, a 
partial order of grounding relations between ontological cat-
egories can be defined and a class of entities can be identified 
as ontologically basic in the sense of being the least element 
in that partial order.
Now, the reader should be reminded that according to 
ontological deflationism all existence statements are equally 
deep or shallow. This means that an ontological deflationist 
cannot, on pain of incoherence, both maintain that items of 
certain categories exist and that they are “nothing over and 
above” whatever category of entities that may be considered 
ontologically basic. In ontological minimalism, as pretty 
much elsewhere, there ain’t such a thing as a free lunch. 
However, while “free lunch” double-talk is not permissible 
within ontological minimalism, the ontological commitment 
to entities of a basic category may be considered to be more 
fundamental than the ontological commitment to classes of 
entities that are higher up in the grounding hierarchy.
Let the notions of “immediate grounding” and “ground-
ing” be defined as follows. A class of entities C1 immediately 
grounds a class of entities C2 if, and only if C1 appears in the 
introduction and elimination rule for C2. A class of entities 
C1 grounds another class of entities C2 if, and only if there is 
a third class of entities C3 such that C1 grounds C3 and C3 
immediately grounds C2.
By this definition, and in consideration of the succession 
of introduction and elimination rules described in the pre-
vious section, one can say that objects immediately ground 
kinds as well as characters, and thus also ground moments. 
Characters immediately ground moments, but neither kinds 
nor moments ground any other class of entities (cf. Fig. 2).
Fig. 2:  Grounding between the elements of the 
Ontological Square
The fact that objects ground all other classes of entities 
within the Ontological Square represents a “victory of sub-
stantial particularity,” inasmuch as both universals and mo-
ments are grounded on objects. However, the present view 
also supports realism in the sense that the introduction rules 
ensure the existence of all classes of entities that belong to the 
Ontological Square. So the present approach emphasizes the 
primacy of objects without denying the existence of kinds, 
characters and moments, which is certainly Aristotelian in 
spirit if not in letter.
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4. TAkING TIME SERIOUSLY WITHIN THE  
 ONTOLOGICAL SQUARE
4.1 Times as substantial universals
According to Strawson (1959, p. 38f), objects, more specifi-
cally material bodies, are also ontologically prior to other 
particulars in terms of particular-identification. The mem-
bers of a category A are (generically) ontologically prior to 
those of a category B if, and only if the Bs are identifiabil-
ity-dependent on the As, i.e. if, and only if the Bs can only 
be identified provided the As have already been singled out 
(Strawson 1959, p. 17). Objects, being three-dimensional 
particulars with some endurance through time, are identifi-
ability-independent because they alone are suitable for being 
nodes within a single spatiotemporal framework of reference 
on which particular-identification ultimately rests (Strawson 
1959, p. 39).
However, someone could object to this thesis on the 
ground that objects are not fine-grained enough in terms of 
their duration in order to constitute sufficiently many tem-
poral reference points within a spatiotemporal framework of 
reference. This may be one of the main reasons why Barry, 
following Moravcsik (1976), has adopted the view that the 
Aristotelian Ontological Square must be completed by add-
ing two categories, namely processes and processual uni-
versals (see Smith 2005). Nonetheless, I maintain that since 
objects gradually come into and go out of being while their 
durations overlap, there should be enough of classes of con-
temporaneous objects to stand in for times. Let us assume 
that these classes are a special subcategory of kinds: these 
kinds could be regarded as the bearers of temporal relations. 
In other words, I propose to regard times as a special sort of 
substantial universals. So, substances are ontologically prior 
in terms of particular-identification after all, if among sub-
stances one includes universal substances, i.e. kinds, as well 
as particular substances, i.e. objects.
Objects are in time inasmuch as they instantiate times; 
since they endure in time, they may instantiate more than 
one time. But objects are not the only temporal entities. 
Indeed, in order to account for accidental change, one may 
assume moments, including the spatial locations of ob-
jects, to be temporally located, too. Thus, an object’s having 
incompatible properties at different times amounts to mo-
ments with different temporal locations inhering in the very 
same object. There are some significant differences between 
moments and objects with respect to being in time, though. 
On the one hand, temporal location of moments cannot not 
be analyzed in terms of instantiation as in the case of objects. 
On the other hand, it is arguable that, contrary to objects, 
moments may be instantaneous, i.e. temporally unilocated. 
4.2 Elements of a basic theory of time
Assuming that times can be associated with universal sub-
stances or kinds, our task is to find introduction and elimi-
nation rules for existence claims specifically about times, 
kinds having already been introduced at an earlier stage of 
the construction of the Language of the Ontological Square. 
In a Priorian fashion, we may assume that ordinary 
modal idioms are primitive and that modal statements con-
stitute the entry ticket for commitments to times (cf. Prior 
1959/1976). Let us assume a simple, if not simplistic modal 
language for temporal reasoning, namely K4t: The modal op-
erators F (“sometimes in the future”) and P (“sometimes in 
the past”) are assumed to be primitive, while the operators G 
(“it is always going to be the case that”) and H (“it has always 
been the case that”) are defined in a straightforward manner:
D1 Gϕ≣  ~ F ~ ϕ
D2 Hϕ≣  ~ P ~ ϕ
Assuming that each syntactically independent or top-level 
sentence is to be evaluated at the present time, we can for-
mulate two introduction and elimination rules, one for fu-
ture times and another for past times, a commitment to the 
present time being concurrent in both rules. So the sentence 
“sometimes in the future it will be the case that ϕ” is the an-
tecedent for the statement that there is at least one time T 
that is preceded by the present time such that ϕ holds at T.7
IE6a Fϕ ⊣⊢ ∃T (T@ ≺ T ∧ [ϕ]T)
Correspondingly, the sentence “sometimes in the past it is 
the case that ϕ” is the antecedent for the statement that there 
is at least one time T that precedes the present time such that 
ϕ holds at T.
IE6b Pϕ ⊣⊢ ∃T (T@ ≺ T ∧ [ϕ]T)
In order to guarantee that all theorems of K4t turn out to 
be true, the relation of temporal precedence has to be transi-
tive at least. 
R2 T ≺ T', T' ≺ T" ⊢T ≺ T"
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The definition of the expression “ϕ holds at T ” ([ϕ]T) is 
obvious for molecular statements; I focus on atomic state-
ments. Now, I suppose, but will not argue for the stance 
that instantiation of kinds by objects and tokenization of 
characters by moments are temporally invariant, that is, 
an object is an instance of its kinds simpliciter or atemporally 
and a moment is a case or token of its characters simpliciter 
or atemporally.8 This invariance is ensured by stipulating 
that “[xo ι Xk]T is equivalent to “xo ι Xk” and “[xm.n τXc.n]T” is 
equivalent to “xm.n τXc.n.” Therefore, the only atomic state-
ments affected by tense are exemplification claims and in-
herence claims.
Thus, the statement that a moment inheres in a (sequence 
of) object(s) at a certain time is tantamount to the statement 
that the moment inheres in this sequence/object and that it 
is located at or a case of that time.
D3 [xm.n ⟨ x1o...xno]T  ≡ xm.n ⟨ x1o...xno ∧ xm.nλT
The statement that a character is exemplified by a (se-
quence of) object(s) at a certain time is tantamount to the 
statement that the character has a case or token that inheres 
in this sequence/object at that time.
D4  [x1o...xno  ϵ Xc.n]T  ≡ ∃xm (xm.n τ Xc.n ∧ [xm.n ⟨x1o...xno]T)
4.3 Fragmentalism and the ineffability of the passage  
 of time
Presentism is the combination of two views:
1. the ordinary tense idioms are primitive;
2. only present entities exist.9
As far as (2) is concerned, both descriptivism and ontolog-
ical minimalism do not seem to be very accommodating. On 
the one hand, the transcendental account of the conditions 
of possibility for particular-identification posits past and 
future entities within a four-dimensional framework of ref-
erence. On the other hand, within ontological minimalism, 
any reduction turns out to be a straightforward introduction 
of the reduced entities into discourse, not their elimination 
from it. This means that in a deflationist context, any attempt 
to eliminate references to past and future entities by reduc-
ing them to references to presently existing things actually 
ends up providing grounds for existence statements about 
non-present entities, these grounds being exactly those 
statements that are supposed to provide the analyses of exis-
tence claims about past and future things.
The situation is slightly different with respect to (1). I have 
shown above how in a minimalist descriptivist setting modal 
idioms may be used as entry tickets or grounds for existence 
claims about times.10 What is more, the existence state-
ments that are introduced into the language already contain 
one ultimately irreducible modal idiom, namely that of the 
uniquely designating expression of “the present moment.”
If the flow of time is real, it is obvious that the reference 
of “the present time” is by no means rigid. This implies that 
the extensions of the predicates “past time” and “future time” 
are not rigid, either. Now, while Aristotelian Four-Category 
Ontology is incomplete without these notions, it seems to 
be under the threat of incoherence if it contains them: as 
time flees, what is future becomes present and what is pres-
ent becomes past. The only way to preserve coherence is to 
distinguish between an untensed (or eternalist) and thus in-
complete trunk ontology and an infinite sequence of tensed 
(or presentist) ontologies into which the former is succes-
sively instantiated and which only differ in the reference of 
the notion of “the present time” and the extension of the 
predicates “past time” and “future time.” The view that tak-
ing the passage of time seriously enforces a fragmentation of 
ontology and the abandonment of the idea of the unity of re-
ality has been christened “fragmentalism” by Fine (2005, pp. 
281–284),11 but has been anticipated by Barry (see Grenon 
and Smith 2004) under the name of SNAP.12 
Now, the passage of time enforces fragmentalism, but 
strictly speaking is invisible in each single presentist ontol-
ogy. Pace Smith (ibid.), a fortiori this gap cannot be closed 
by adjoining an ontology of processes (which he calls SPAN) 
since this ontology is untensed. Hence neither a presentist 
ontology nor the eternalist trunk ontology can represent the 
passage of time: in this sense it is ineffable. Instead it shows 
itself in the succession of presentist ontologies: the flow of 
time is not ontological, nor meta-ontological, but literally 
dia-ontological.
What holds for the passage of time is even more so true for 
(human) action or activity (in the sense of energeia) as con-
trasted with the act (in the sense of ergon) that is its result. 
The diaontological character of action could be at the root of 
the puzzling problem of free will: the escape route between 
the Scylla of determinism and the Charybdis of indetermin-
ism may be neither within, nor above, but in between on-
tologies.
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CONCLUSION
To sum up, then, I basically agree with Barry on two views:
1. Aristotelian ontology remains a viable option both in 
philosophy and in applied ontology.
2. The nature of time, namely that time passes, suggests 
that there is no overall unitary account of temporal re-
ality, but that its description is fragmented into a suc-
cession of infinitely many presentist ontologies.
Nonetheless, I disagree with him on four issues:
1. The commitment to a methodology that emphasises 
the role of conceptual analysis does not conflict with 
the fundamental assumption of realism.
2. The Aristotelian Ontological Square can be defended 
as a categorial framework of descriptive metaphysics 
using a minimalist methodology. 
3. The Aristotelian Ontological Square as a Four Category 
Ontology is complete insofar as it:
a) accounts for the varieties of ordinary language 
attribution, 
b) can be validated in a formally rigorous manner, 
by showing how, starting from a feature-placing 
language as a fictional “degree zero” of ontology, 
a series of languages can be constructed, each 
resulting from its predecessor by the addition of 
terms referring to or ranging over a new category 
of entities, as well as of introduction/elimination-
rules for existence claims regarding members of 
this category.
Provided the reality of the flow of time is granted, even the 
totality of presentist ontologies or views on reality is incom-
plete in the sense that it cannot capture the passage of time. 
But the ineffable shows itself precisely where, pace Smith, 
ontology fails.
Let me close on a personal note: at the beginning of this 
paper I have described Barry as a man of strongly held opin-
ions. I may add that he defends this views in an uncom-
promising, sometimes formidable manner, especially if he 
fundamentally disagrees with his opponent(s)—in this re-
spect he is only equaled or maybe even surpassed by Kevin 
Mulligan, my other “Doktorvater.” However, I have to ac-
knowledge his immense generosity and even tolerance for 
diverging views if their holder is capable of standing his or 
her ground. In this respect I sincerely recognize my personal 
debt to Barry, since without his support and opposition, I 
would not be the philosopher I am, however minor this sta-
tus may be.
NOTES
1 My only minute claim to fame in the applied ontology 
community is the fact that I am the last-mentioned co-
author of the famous (2002) paper “Sweetening ontolo-
gies with DOLCE.”
2 So called because of its iconographic representation 
which can already be found in Carolingian manuscripts 
of Boethius’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories; cf. 
Dufour 2014.
3 At least according to Porphyry’s Commentary (Busse 
1887, pp. 22–79); cf. also Evangeliou 1996, pp. 51–53.
4 In applied ontology, this view has been defended e.g. by 
Gary Merrill (2010).
5 By calling the nexus between the terms a “non-relation-
al tie,” one wishes to convey that it should not be reified 
as a relational universal.
6 In a sense I turn Wiggins’ principle of sortal depen-
dence (cf. his 2001, p. 56) upside down in order to single 
out the class of sortals.
7 For variables over times, I shall ignore the complication 
of category superscripts.
8 I shall ignore the complication of so-called “phase- 
sortals”.
9 These views are classically put forward in Prior’s works 
(cf. Fine 2005, p. 133).
10 Note, however, that while this may be a reduction, it is 
not, by the very nature of the deflationist approach, an 
elimination.
11 It should be pointed out that I beg to differ with Fine 
concerning the ontological commitment to times.
12 It may be an irony that I have ended up admitting a po-
sition with which I used to differ viscerally while staying 
in Leipzig at Barry Smith’s IFOMIS.
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